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Chapter 10 
The Implications of Free Will Skepticism for Establishing Criminal Liability  
Elizabeth Shaw 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have argued that the traditional concepts 
of free will and moral responsibility should be rejected. If these concepts were abandoned, 
what would be the practical implications for the criminal justice system? In an influential 
article, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen (2004) have argued that we should take this 
question seriously, because they predict that new evidence from neuroscience will 
increasingly undermine our notions of free will and responsibility in a way that is more vivid 
and accessible than abstract philosophical theorizing. This evidence will cause ordinary 
people to question the presuppositions upon which our legal system is currently based. In 
particular, they will question the retributivist justification for punishment, which claims that 
punishment is a deserved response to free actions for which criminals are morally 
responsible. Greene and Cohen believe that, although retributivism is unsustainable in view 
of the arguments for free will skepticism, the practice of punishing criminals can still be 
justified on consequentialist grounds. In addition, they note very briefly that 
consequentialism can justify the retention of various criminal defenses. However, in common 
with most writers on this topic, they do not give detailed consideration to the process of 
establishing criminal liability in a trial, but instead focus on the general justification for 
punishment.  
This paper discusses the implications of rejecting the notions of free will and 
retribution for the process of establishing criminal liability in a trial. Currently, it is a general 
principle of UK and American law that before a person can be convicted of a crime the 
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prosecution must prove three things. Firstly, the accused must have performed the actus reus 
–the prohibited act. Secondly, (with the exception of strict liability offences) the prosecution 
must prove mens rea—a mental state such as intention or recklessness. Thirdly, the accused 
must lack a valid defense, such as self-defense. This paper argues that these prerequisites for 
criminal liability should be retained. It offers a rationale for these prerequisites, which 
appeals to considerations such as the value of liberty and moral communication, but which 
does not depend on the concepts of free will and retribution. This paper then focuses 
specifically on the defenses of self-defense, provocation, and mental disorder.  
2. Key Terms 
Before presenting my main arguments, I will define some key terms. 
2.1 Retributivism 
This paper will focus on an influential version of retributivism, which holds that punishing 
the guilty is intrinsically good.1 According to this version of retributivism, the state is not 
merely entitled to punish the guilty. Rather, the state has a moral duty to punish offenders, 
purely because they deserve to suffer, even if punishing them serves no further purpose.2  For 
the retributivist, the judgment that someone is morally responsible for committing a criminal 
offence means that the criminal action belongs to the offender in such a way that she deserves 
to be punished for it, irrespective of the consequences of imposing punishment. (In this paper, 
the term “retributive responsibility” will be used to refer to this kind of moral responsibility.)3 
                                                        
1 For a defense of this view see Moore (1997). For criticisms of other versions of retributivism, see Mackie 
(1982), Honderich (1984).   
2 Reform and deterrence are examples of purposes punishment might serve, which form no part of the 
retributive theory of justice. 
3This definition of retributive responsibility is based on definitions given by Derk Pereboom (2006: 211-212; 
2002: 479). Richard Double uses the term “retributive moral responsibility” in (2002: 516). The connection 
between retributivism and responsibility is also discussed by Ted Honderich. Honderich argues that retributive 
judgments depend on “holding people responsible in a certain way…a way that is inconsistent with 
determinism” (2002: 101-2; 139). See also H.L.A. Hart (1968) and Galen Strawson (2002). Strawson asks “Are 
[people] ever responsible for the their actions in such a way that they are, without any sort of qualification, 
morally deserving of …punishment…for them?” (2002: 442). Honderich argues for an alternative, non-
retributive conception of responsibility in How Free Are You? (2002: ch. 8-11). Pereboom also advocates a non-
retributive conception of moral responsibility in (2006: 211-212).  
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The principle that the guilty should receive the punishment that they deserve is known as 
positive retributivism, since it is meant to provide a positive reason in favor of punishment. In 
contrast, the idea that those who are not guilty should be spared punishment (and that the 
guilty should receive no more punishment than they deserve) is known as negative 
retributivism. Those who endorse negative retributivism insist that this principle should 
constrain the state’s power to punish. Unless otherwise indicated, the term “retributivism” 
will refer to theories that include both the positive and the negative retributive principle. 
2.2 Free Will 
I will use the term free will to refer to the ability to control one’s actions in a way that could 
make one an appropriate candidate for judgments of retributive responsibility. 
2.3 Free Will Skepticism 
Free will skeptics believe that people lack free will and are not retributively responsible for 
their actions. They believe this either because they think determinism is true and that it is 
incompatible with free will and retributive responsibility, or because they think that free will 
and retributive responsibility are incompatible with both determinism and with 
indeterminism.  
2.4 Determinism 
Many free will skeptics argue that the truth of determinism, would pose a serious challenge 
for free will and thus for retributive responsibility. Determinism, as it applies to human 
behavior, is the theory that the deliberations, choices and conduct of every individual are 
causally necessitated by factors that are ultimately beyond the individual’s control. 
Determinism does not imply that our psychological states, such as our intentions, desires and 
beliefs, make no difference to our actions. Rather, determinism implies that, if our actions are 
to be explained by reference to such psychological phenomena as mentioned above, then 
these phenomena were themselves produced by prior events that were causally sufficient for 
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the occurrence of those psychological phenomena and that those prior events were 
themselves produced in the same manner by even earlier events etc. in an unbroken chain of 
cause and effect that can be traced back to before the person was even born. Nor does 
determinism imply that people will fail to modify their behavior in response to good reasons 
for doing so. It merely implies that whether a person recognizes and responds to one 
particular reason for action rather than another at any given time is determined by prior 
events in the manner described above. This paper examines the implications of the view that 
determinism (or indeterminism) is incompatible with retributive responsibility. However, this 
paper assumes that determinism is compatible with rationality (see, e.g., Bradley 1966: 260; 
Dennett 1982: 161). 
In this paper, the term determinism will be used to mean the theory that human 
behavior is determined. The proposition that all events are caused has been contested by 
physicists. On one theory, indeterminism exists at the quantum level of subatomic 
phenomena. Some theorists have claimed that quantum physics may lend support to the idea 
that human actions are undetermined (e.g., Swinburne 2004: 169-170). However, free will 
skeptics have argued that even if quantum events affect human behavior, it is unlikely that 
this could provide a satisfactory basis for retributive responsibility. 
In this paper I will not discuss the arguments in favor of free will skepticism or the 
arguments against retributivism. Instead, I will focus on the practical implications for of 
rejecting the traditional concepts of free will and retributive moral responsibility. 
3. The Actus Reus Requirement 
Currently, before a sentence can be imposed on an offender, it must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused performed the actus reus of an offence. If we abandoned 
retributivism we would still be justified in detaining dangerous offenders in order to protect 
society. However, it might be questioned whether there would be any non-retributive reason 
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for insisting that a person should only be detained after it had been proved that she had 
already committed a crime. In this section, I will consider three non-retributive reasons for 
the actus reus requirement—the value of liberty, the idea that predictions of dangerousness 
that do not appeal to past offending are not sufficiently individualized and the principle of 
fair warning. 
3.1 Liberty 
According to retributivists, only their theory can provide an adequate justification for having 
the actus reus requirement. This requirement follows from negative retributivism – the idea 
that we should not punish the innocent. If we abandoned retributivism, it might be feared that 
the state could imprison people based on a mere suspicion that they might commit a crime in 
the future, even if the person had never actually broken the law. However, punishing 
someone on this basis would involve placing too much emphasis on security at the expense of 
liberty. The actus reus requirement can be defended on non-retributive grounds—it upholds 
the value of liberty by protecting the individual against the power of the state. In order to 
safeguard liberty, the state should be required to prove the individual’s dangerousness to a 
high standard. Past behavior is one of the best guides to future behavior (see Callender 2010: 
ch.8). It is therefore appropriate that proof that the individual has actually engaged in 
dangerous conduct should be a necessary condition for interfering with liberty.  
It might be objected that free will skeptics cannot rely on the value of liberty, because 
liberty is only valuable if individuals possess free will. However, free will skeptics have 
argued that the kind of “liberty” or “freedom” that is protected by human rights such as the 
right to “freedom of movement” is different from the sense of “freedom” that is at issue in the 
debate about free will and retribution. A person can get satisfaction from acting in accordance 
with her preferences and can be frustrated if she is prevented from doing so. This can be true 
regardless of the origin of these preferences, i.e. regardless of whether these preferences are 
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predetermined or due to chance. Free will skeptics can therefore still value liberty—in the 
sense of the freedom to act in accordance with one’s preferences. 
An example involving someone who is clearly not responsible in the retributive sense 
can support the claim that the freedom to act in accordance with one’s preferences is still 
valuable regardless of whether we have “free will” in the sense required by retributivism. 
Somebody with severe learning disabilities might lack the free will necessary for retributive 
responsibility. However, such a person might still be able to enjoy liberty in the sense of 
being able to act in accordance with her preferences and being free from coercion by others. 
If this person had never actually engaged in dangerous conduct, it would be objectionable to 
interfere with her liberty on the basis of a mere suspicion that she could pose a danger to 
others. 
The value of being able to act on one’s preferences without external coercion stems 
partly from the satisfaction that this produces. However, it is plausible that it is also 
intrinsically valuable. To support the claim that liberty could have this intrinsic value even if 
we lack “free will” in the retributive sense, let us return to the example of an individual who 
is not responsible in the retributive sense due to severe learning disabilities. Such an 
individual may nevertheless be able to carry out some self-directed, independent activities—
activities that involve exercising liberty. Even if the person would be equally content to lead 
a more passive life, dependent on others and governed by others’ decisions (and even if it 
were guaranteed that others’ support could be relied on) it seems plausible that it would be 
worthwhile for the individual to adopt the life-style that involves more liberty. 
3.2 Evidence of dangerousness should be individualized 
Another non-retributive reason in favor of the actus reus requirement is the idea that 
predictions of dangerousness that do not rely on past offending behavior are not sufficiently 
individualized. If these predictions do not rely on the particular individual’s own behavior, 
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then they must rely more heavily on statistical generalizations.4 Locking people up on the 
basis of such generalizations seems intuitively objectionable.  
It might be objected that this intuition about the importance of individualized 
evidence really stems from negative retributivism—the idea that we must not punish those 
who are not morally blameworthy. However, in response, it should be noted that imposing 
negative consequences on someone based on statistical generalizations is typically regarded 
as unfair, even in contexts where retributive responsibility is not relevant. For example, 
imagine that there were evidence that, on average, women had significantly lower spatial 
abilities than men. Spatial abilities are important for certain professions, e.g. being a pilot. It 
would be unfair to apply a blanket rule that women could not be pilots or to automatically 
give preference to male candidates. This is because each individual should have the 
opportunity to prove through his/her own performance whether that individual has the ability 
to do the job. This principle of fairness does not stem from retributivism. Assuming that 
spatial abilities are determined by one’s genes and/or environment, people are not 
retributively praiseworthy or blameworthy for having or failing to have good spatial abilities. 
By analogy, therefore, it could be argued that fairness requires that each individual should be 
given the opportunity to prove through his/her own actions whether that individual is non-
dangerous and this principle applies independently of retributivism. 
3.3 Fair warning 
A third non-retributive reason in favor of the actus reus requirement is that this requirement 
gives people advance notice of when they would be liable to interference by the criminal 
justice system. Individuals will know that they will be immune from such interference, unless 
they perform certain prohibited actions. Giving people fair warning will reduced people’s 
                                                        
4 The idea that past behavior is a good predictor of future behavior also relies partly on a statistical 
generalization, but it is more individualized than other methods of predicting dangerousness that do not appeal 
to the particular individual’s past behavior. 
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fear of the state and will increase people’s ability to plan their lives. It will thus help to 
promote the general welfare.  
4. The Mens Rea Requirement 
Currently, the prosecution must prove mens rea—a mental state such as intention or 
recklessness (unless the crime is one of strict liability). According to negative retributivism, 
the mens rea requirement is based on the principle that a person should only be punished if 
she were morally blameworthy for committing a crime. If retributivism were abandoned, 
what reason would there be against simply detaining anyone who performs a prohibited act, 
regardless of the person’s mental state? In this section, I will consider three non-retributive 
reasons for the mens rea requirement. Two of these reasons, liberty and fair warning were 
also advanced in support of the actus reus requirement (see above). The third reason is the 
value of moral education.  
4.1 Liberty 
H.L.A. Hart argued that the mens rea requirement should be preserved in order to safeguard 
individuals’ liberty. More people would actually be detained if the mens rea requirement 
were abandoned. Hart writes: “if we are… to be liable if we [perform a prohibited act] by 
accident, by mistake… etc., the chances that we shall incur the sanctions are immeasurably 
increased.” In order to avoid being subjected to sanctions, people might also refrain from 
engaging in various legitimate, valuable activities, if they believed there was a risk that they 
might accidentally breach a prohibition while engaging in these activities. Deterring people 
from engaging in these activities in the first place would also constitute an interference with 
liberty. 
4.2 Fair Warning 
Hart also argued that the mens rea requirement should be preserved, because individuals will 
be better able to predict when they will be subject to legal sanctions than they would be if 
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they could be detained simply because they had performed a prohibited action. If an 
individual cannot predict when she will be subjected to state sanctions, she will live in a 
permanent state of fear and it will be difficult for her to plan her activities. 
4.3 Moral Communication 
Convicting someone can be an important act of moral communication, even if the message 
being communicated is not a retributive one. It is a public declaration that the offender has 
committed a criminal offence. This also typically involves declaring that the offender 
committed a serious moral wrong, since the offence-definition typically specifies a serious 
moral wrong. Free will skeptics have argued at length that actions can be morally right or 
wrong, even if we are not morally responsible in the retributive sense.5 Declaring that the 
offender committed a serious moral wrong can serve forward-looking purposes. It allows 
society to express and reinforce their commitment to the values that have been breached, it 
helps the community to develop its understanding of those values and it can help criminals to 
reform, by bringing them to recognize the wrong that they have done. This third function of 
moral communication could only be fulfilled if the accused had mens rea at the time of the 
crime. If the actus reus were performed by accident then attempts to reform the offender 
would be unnecessary. 
There is very widespread agreement about the appropriateness of morally appraising 
the conduct of offenders, even among those who argue that offenders are not morally 
responsible in the retributive sense. Pereboom, who is at the most skeptical extreme of the 
spectrum of views on free will, claims that the arguments against free will (while 
undermining retributivism) give us no reason to doubt our right to morally criticize 
wrongdoers’ conduct. Free will skeptics accept the legitimacy of engaging the wrongdoer in 
dialogue about the moral quality of his actions and about his reasons for performing them; 
                                                        
5 This chapter will assume that they are correct, but there is not scope within this chapter to defend this claim. 
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evaluating what these actions reveal about his attitudes or character traits; and demanding 
that he engages in self-reflection and apologizes for his behavior. Pereboom writes: 
The moral responsibility invoked here has been called the moral answerability 
or the fittingness of providing a moral explanation sense, and it is the variety 
of moral responsibility that is most thoroughly ingrained in our practice and 
least controversial… It may well characterize human interactions across 
cultures…The main thread of the historical free will debate does not pose 
determinism as a challenge to moral responsibility as answerability, and free 
will skeptics accept that we are morally responsible in this sense. (2013: 51)6 
Free will skeptics would object to the practice of condemning or punishing offenders purely 
in order to make them experience psychological suffering. However, moral-appraisability 
serves forward-looking goals (such as helping the offender to develop more morally desirable 
character traits) that could be endorsed by free will skeptics. Some free will skeptics have 
doubted whether these goals are weighty enough to justify state coercion, on their own 
(Tadros 2011). Free will skeptics tend to justify the state coercion of offenders by referring to 
the need to protect society from dangerous individuals. Nevertheless, even if the reason why 
offenders should be subject to coercion is based on the need to protect society from 
dangerous offenders, free will skeptics can still consistently maintain that the way in which 
offenders are subject to state coercion should communicate a message about the offender’s 
moral answerability. The mens rea requirement is necessary in order to ensure that this 
message is communicated accurately. 
                                                        
6 Pereboom recognizes that his conception of moral answerability cannot justify the “hard treatment” aspect of 
punishment, without relying on retributive ideas that he rejects. In line with his incapacitation theory, Pereboom 
proposes that non-dangerous criminals should be allowed to go free, but he does not say whether, in his view, 
they should be acquitted. Indeed he does not mention how we are to determine whether an individual is a 
“criminal”—through a trial or through some other procedure. It is submitted that in most cases the forward-
looking benefits that can flow from morally appraising offenders at the conviction stage, justify convicting 
offenders who have committed serious moral wrongs, even if they are not dangerous. This conclusion seems to 
be consistent with Pereboom’s overall position.  
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5. Defenses 
The next part of this paper focuses specifically on the defenses of self-defense, provocation 
and mental disorder. It argues that these defenses could be retained even if we abandoned the 
traditional notions of free will and retribution. It also considers whether these defenses or 
their underlying rationale, would need to be revised. This paper focuses on the defenses of 
provocation, self-defense and mental disorder as they are defined in Scotland and England. 
5.1 Provocation 
Provocation is a partial defense to murder. In Scotland, the defense of provocation has the 
following requirements.7 Firstly, there must be a recognized form of provocation – either 
provocation by assault or provocation by infidelity. Secondly, the accused must have a loss of 
self-control. Thirdly, for provocation by assault the violence used by the accused must not 
have been grossly disproportionate to the provocation. For provocation by infidelity an 
ordinary person must have been liable to react in the same way.  
In England, the defense of  “loss of control” is roughly equivalent to the provocation 
defense in Scotland. It has the following requirements.8 Firstly, there must have been a loss 
of self-control. Secondly, that loss of self-control must have had a qualifying trigger, which 
includes either a) circumstances of an extremely grave character, which caused the defendant 
to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged, or b) fear of serious violence from the 
victim. Thirdly, the accused must have satisfied the ordinary person test—a person of same 
age and sex with normal self-restraint and tolerance might have reacted that way in those 
circumstances. 
According to the currently accepted rationale for the provocation defense, the person 
who kills in response to provocation is partially excused, but in order for the defense to 
                                                        
7 Drury v HMA 2001 S.L.T. 1013 
8 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54 
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succeed the anger that motivated the killing must have been justified. If free will skepticism 
is correct then is anger in response to someone’s provocative behavior ever truly justified? 
Anger in the sense of “retributive outrage” could not be justified. However, other similar 
emotional states could be. If, for instance, a person is physically attacked, it is appropriate for 
the person to feel very upset (and to experience a different kind of negative emotion than the 
person might feel if she were hurt by a non-moral being e.g. an animal). In addition, it would 
be appropriate to feel a sense of repulsion at the moral “defect” that led to the attacker’s 
action, even if that defect was not something for which the attacker was retributively 
responsible. It is also appropriate to feel a strong sense of disapproval that a moral wrong has 
been committed. (I have assumed that the concepts of moral right and wrong are compatible 
with determinism, even though the concept of moral responsibility construed in the 
retributive sense is not.) The provocation defense should require that the above types of 
emotion are justified, but not that retributive anger is justified.  
This approach might have the additional advantage of reducing the risk that the 
provocation defense is seen as blaming the victim. Retributive anger is only appropriate if the 
victim is blameworthy. So saying that the provoked person’s anger is justified implies that 
the victim deserved blame. However, the negative emotions that are justifiable on the free 
will skeptic’s view do not imply that the victim was retributively blameworthy.   
A non-retributive provocation defense would not entail that offenders should be excused 
merely because their offence was due to the effect of intense emotions, because it would still 
be necessary that the circumstances warranted a strong emotional reaction of the kind 
described above. 
5.2 Self-Defense 
Self-defense is a complete defense. It has three requirements in Scotland. There must have 
been an imminent danger to life or limb, no reasonable opportunity to retreat and the 
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accused’s reaction must be proportionate.9 In England, self-defense has the following 
requirements.10 The defendant must have believed the victim posed an unjustified threat to 
the defendant himself or another or property. The use of force must be necessary. The degree 
of force must be reasonable (proportionality). The defendant must have acted in order to 
prevent the victim’s attack. 
Self-defense theorists are divided over whether it is ever permissible for an attacked 
person to harm/kill an “innocent aggressor.” An aggressor may be considered innocent if, for 
instance, he was psychotic, and therefore not morally responsible at the time of the attack. 
Many theorists maintain that the self-defense justification should cover both innocent and 
responsible offenders alike. However, a few argue that harming/ killing an innocent aggressor 
is never justified, although it may sometimes be excusable. A third, “compromise” view 
holds that harming/killing an innocent aggressor is only justified under much more restrictive 
circumstances than when the aggressor is morally responsible. 
Self-defense theorists who consider the “innocence” or “culpability” of the aggressor 
to be morally relevant, often appeal to the following considerations. They may argue that 
innocent aggressors had the bad luck, to be subject to circumstances outwith their control 
which caused them to attack. They may argue that we should therefore have particular 
compassion for innocent aggressors, which should be reflected in the legal definition of self-
defense. In contrast, the culpable aggressor chose to initiate the attack. It may be argued that 
it is therefore justifiable to use harmful or lethal force against the culpable aggressor, because 
his moral guilt entails that his interests are now less valuable than the interests of the attacked 
person, or because the culpable aggressor “forfeited” his right to life/bodily integrity as a 
result of his immoral actions. 
                                                        
9 HMA v Doherty 1954 J.C. 1 
10 Northern Ireland’s Reference (No.1 of 1975) 
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  This type of account has a distinctively retributive flavor.11 Its judgment about the 
culpable aggressor is strongly reminiscent of P.F. Strawson’s description of the attitude of 
retributive indignation—an attitude which entails a “partial withdrawal of goodwill” towards 
the wrongdoer and which entails a “modification...of the general demand that another should, 
if possible, be spared suffering” (1962: 187). The free will skeptic could not endorse this type 
of reasoning, but would insist that all aggressors are ultimately victims of bad luck, even if 
the aggressor’s behavior flowed from his ‘choice’ to do wrong. For that choice was either 
completely determined by factors wholly outwith the aggressor’s control, or else it was due to 
a random occurrence for which the aggressor was not responsible. 
Would a free will skeptic’s theory of self-defense treat all aggressors equally, 
regardless of whether their attack was the product of psychosis or a rational choice? Not 
necessarily. A free will skeptic might distinguish between these different types of aggressor if 
there were non-retributive (e.g. consequentialist) reasons for doing so. However, this 
distinction must not be based on the idea that one type of aggressor is merely unlucky and so 
worthy of special legal protection, whereas another type is undeserving of compassion and 
legal protection, purely because of the nature of his act of aggression.  
If all aggressors are unlucky, does this mean that killing/harming an aggressor in self-
defense is only ever excusable and never justified? Free will skepticism does not necessarily 
entail this conclusion either. Many self-defense theorists argue that self-defense can be a 
justification regardless of whether the aggressor’s behavior was the result of circumstances 
outwith his control. This position accords with widespread intuitions. “Common sense” 
seems to tell us that (all other things being equal) people are entitled to defend themselves 
against an attack which poses an immediate threat of significant physical harm or death, 
                                                        
11It is, however, not exactly the same as the retributive justification for punishment. Even theorists who place a 
lot of weight on the aggressor’s “guilt” still accept that the use of self-defensive force against an aggressor is 
justified in order to prevent harm to the attacked person, not in order to punish the aggressor for his attack.  
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regardless of whether the attacker made himself into the kind of person who would attack 
people, or was just unlucky to have turned out that way. It seems absurd to suggest that, when 
faced with an aggressor who is in some sense “innocent,”12 attacked people have a “duty of 
martyrdom” and should meekly submit to the attack, rather than harm the aggressor 
(Kaufman 2010). 
However, the free will skeptic’s arguments should make us reconsider what precisely 
is meant by saying that self-defense is a justification of defense. On a “modest” 
interpretation, saying that it is justified to use force to defend oneself, means that it is morally 
and legally permissible to use force; that, all things considered, the use of force is acceptable. 
Theorists who adopt this interpretation often emphasize that harming/killing someone is 
always regrettable, but that in extreme circumstances it can be the least bad option. In 
contrast, Boaz Sangero argues that self-defense should be portrayed as a “real and strong” 
justification. He writes “...private defense should not be viewed as evil, and not even as the 
lesser evil, but as the ‘best possible good.’ It concerns a desirable action...” (Sangero 2008: 
17). Having characterized self-defense in this way, Sangero then argues that it should be 
reserved for the killing/harming of “guilty” aggressors, and that it shows a “lack of 
compassion” to allow self-defense to cover the killing/harming of “innocent” aggressors, 
such as a children, or psychotic individuals. Now, it does indeed seem somewhat heartless to 
characterize harming/killing child-aggressors or psychotic-aggressors as positively 
“desirable,” or to appear to welcome their injury/death by calling it the “best possible good.” 
Nevertheless, it can still be appropriate to say that harming/killing such aggressors is 
“justified” in the more modest sense described above. The modest account of justification in 
terms of an all-things-considered judgment of permissibility better captures the moral 
complexity of this kind of situation than Sangero’s description of a justified action as 
                                                        
12 Because, e.g., he lacked either libertarian or compatibilist free will. 
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something which is unequivocally “desirable.” Given the considerations advanced by the free 
will skeptic, it seems inappropriate to label the killing/injury of any aggressor as justified in 
Sangero’s sense of the word. All aggressors are victims of bad luck and are entitled to 
compassion. Maintaining that harming/killing another in self-defense is only justified as “the 
lesser of two evils” acknowledges that every life is valuable and that causing death or injury 
is always a terrible thing (even when justified).  
5.3. Mental Disorder 
The forward-looking approach to dealing with criminal behavior which is outlined in this 
paper provides a method for determining the scope of mental disorder defenses. The state 
should aim (among other things) to communicate to offenders that that they have committed 
a serious wrong, to make clear the reasons why the behavior was wrong and to enter into 
dialogue with the offender with the aim of reforming him. This suggests that offenders who 
are incapable of engaging in genuine dialogue or undergoing reform, should not be held 
responsible. Other theories of punishment often leave the question of the scope of mental 
disorder defenses largely down to intuition. E.g. some people have the intuition that an 
offender deserves punishment just as long as he knew that his behavior was wrong in the 
sense of being aware what the legal or moral rules are, without any depth of understanding. 
Others have the intuition that a person is only retributively blameworthy if he knew the 
difference between right and wrong in a deeper sense. A forward-looking communication 
theory can help to settle this dispute, by interpreting “knowledge” in terms of the ability to 
undergo moral dialogue. This is not an advantage that is unique to a hard-incompatibilist 
communication theory. Duff’s retributive communication theory, for instance, also has this 
advantage (Duff 2001). Nevertheless it is still a merit of the approach advanced in this paper. 
6. Conclusion 
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Even if the notions of free will and retributive responsibility were abandoned then the mens 
rea and actus reus requirements and various defenses could be still be retained. However, 
some of these legal rules, as well as the rationale behind them, would need to be revised. 
 
References 
Bradley, M. C. (1966). A note on Mr. MacIntyre’s Determinism. In B. Berofsky, ed., Free 
Will and Determinism. New York: Harper and Row.   
 
Callender, J. (2010). Free Will and Responsibility: A Guide for Practitioners. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Dennett, D. (1982). Mechanism and responsibility. In G. Watson, ed., Free Will: Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.   
 
Double, R. (2002). Metaethics, metaphilosophy and free will subjectivism. In R. Kane, ed., 
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Duff, R. A. (2001). Punishment, Communication and Community. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Greene, J., and J. Cohen. (2004). For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 359: 1775–1785. 
 
Hart, H. L. A. (1968). Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
  
281 
Honderich, T. (1984). Punishment: The Supposed Justifications. Pluto Press.  
 
Honderich, T. (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Kaufman, W. (2010). Self-defense, innocent aggressors and the duty of martyrdom. Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly, 91(1): 78-96. 
 
Mackie, J. L. (1982). Morality and the retributive emotions. Criminal Justice Ethics, 1(1): 3-
10. 
 
Moore, M. (1997). Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Pereboom, D. (2002). Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism. In R. 
Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Pereboom, D. (2006). Reasons-responsiveness, alternative possibilities, and manipulation 
arguments against compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way. 
Philosophical Books, 47(3): 198-212.   
 
Pereboom, D. (2013). Free will skepticism and criminal punishment. In T. Nadelhoffer, ed., 
The Future of Punishment, pp. 49-78. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
  
282 
Sangero, B. (2008). In defense of Self-Defence in Criminal Law; and on Killing in Self-
Defence  A reply to Fiona Leverick. Criminal Law Bulletin, 44(6): 1-34. 
 
Strawson, G. (2002). The bounds of freedom. In R. Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free 
Will. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 
48: 1-25.   
 
Swinburne, R. (2004). The Existence of God, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Tadros, V. (2011). The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
